ISI : Taliban in complete control of Swat

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ISI tells Pak political leadership Taliban in complete control of Swat Islamabad , Oct 9 (ANI):

 In the in-camera joint sitting of both the Houses of the parliament yesterday, Pakistan s political leadership was told by the countrys military and sleuths of intelligence agency ISI that the Taliban was in complete control of some districts in NWFP, like Swat and Shangla.

They apprised the politicians, including MPs, chief ministers and governors of all four provinces, chiefs of all the major political parties, about the methods of the Taliban in indoctrinating the young boys into taking to terrorism, and also about the torture methods used on abducted militarymen.

Gen Pasha said 1368 troops had died in the fight since 2001, and the military had killed 2825 Taliban and terrorists including 581 foreigners. Some of them were crossing into Pakistan from Afghanistan to fight Pakistani troops in Bajaur, Gen Pasha said and added that the US and Afghan authorities had been informed.

Newly-appointed ISI Director General Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha briefed the parliamentarians about the difficulties the Pakistan Army was facing in the operation against the terrorists. The military was capable of dealing with the threat, he added.

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Ahmadinejad orders Iranian press what to write/

Iranian Regime Instructs on Press How to Report on Nuclear Issue and Iraq

On March 5, 2008, the online daily Rooz exposed a secret letter dated February 11, 2008 from Iran's Supreme National Security Council to the editors of Iranian newspapers and news agencies. The letter, signed by the Deputy Minister of Education and Islamic Guidance, was sent in preparation for the publication of the report by International Atomic Energy Agency director Mohamed ElBaradei (on February 22, 2008) and the U.N. Security Council's third sanctions resolution against Iran (on March 3, 2008). It contained instructions for the reporting of various issues - especially on the ElBaradei report, which assessed the extent of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA, on the Iran-U.S. talks regarding Iraq, and on the recent elections in Iran. It also contained guidelines regarding the proper line to take towards the U.N. and the West.

The instructions stressed the following propaganda messages: Iran must be presented as having scored a victory in the nuclear arena, regardless of the findings of the ElBaradei report; threats must be made against the West, and especially against Europe, against persisting in their anti-Iran policy; Western policy must be presented as motivated by a desire to keep the Islamic world in a state of technological backwardness; Iranian public opinion must be presented as uniformly supportive of the nuclear program; the Islamic world must be presented as unanimously sympathetic to Iran and to its nuclear achievements; the sanctions resolution must be described as illegal, and a contemptuous tone must be taken towards the U.N. institutions and its resolutions. The letter was stamped "secret" (for a photograph of the original letter, as published by Rooz, see the appendix to this report).

Citing a source in the Iranian President's Office, Rooz also reported that this office received instructions to prepare public festivities to celebrate the favorable findings of the ElBaradei report - this, two weeks before the report was published. The source also stated that, after the publication of report, the President's Office reviewed the headlines of the major Iranian papers, and ranked them according to their compliance with the letter of guidelines to the media. According to the source, the Tehran Chief Prosecutor's office was instructed to take punitive steps against the daily Etemad, which presented an independent analysis characterizing the ElBaradei report as "ambivalent."

Following the publication of the IAEA report, dissident journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi condemned Ahmadinejad's government for the slanted manner in which it had presented this report to the Iranian public. Zeidabadi wrote that Ahmadinejad's government habitually lies to the people, and distorts reports and quotations in order to gain the public's support for its policies.

The following are excerpts from the Rooz reports and from Zeidabadi's article.


The Supreme National Security Council's Secret Letter of Guidelines

"To: All editors of the national press and local news agencies.

"Dear sirs,

"Following are the decisions of the Media Policy Committee of the Supreme National Security Council secretariat regarding [coverage of] the nuclear issue, Iraq, the elections, etc., brought to you for perusal and implementation.

"A. The Nuclear Issue

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Pakistan's army in control of the Swat Valley

Jan. 17 (Bloomberg) -- Pakistan's army said it took control of the Swat Valley near Afghanistan after a three-month operation against pro-Taliban Islamic fighters.

``Troops have pushed out the miscreants from the Swat Valley to an adjoining isolated area'' in the mountains, Major General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the director-general of military operations, said at a briefing yesterday, according to the official Associated Press of Pakistan.

Thirty-six soldiers and nine civilians were killed during the offensives, the general said, without saying how many militants died. More than 615 people were arrested, 100 of whom are still being detained, he added.
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Al Qaeda Documents Show Internal Trouble

By Kevin Whitelaw Thu Oct 11, 10:16 AM ET

A new study released by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy examines the history of splits among the top leadership of al Qaeda and finds that the terrorist network may be more vulnerable than many officials suggest.

"From its beginnings . . . al Qaeda has been at war with itself," says the report, which draws upon a trove of captured internal al Qaeda documents and correspondence released by the Department of Defense. The translated documents depict an organization of al Qaeda associates who frequently protest decisions made by al Qaeda's leader Osama bin Laden, as well as his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The report documents a constant theme of the group's leaders arguing over everything from immediate tactics to the wisdom of making the United States the group's primary target. It also shows how prejudices of the group's Arab leaders against their non-Arab affiliates and their former Taliban hosts repeatedly led to serious infighting and even some betrayals. The report's authors conclude that many of these splits remain a characteristic of al Qaeda today.

"There is no evidence to suggest that it has overcome the persistent weaknesses identified in this report," they write, adding that the group's transition to a global "brand" name has created new vulnerabilities that could make it open to exploitation.

"Lacking a broad command-and-control structure, al Qaeda Central finds itself unable to control the uses--and abuses--of its brand by self-starting 'affiliate' groups." They point to the gory tactics of the now deceased Abu Musab Zarqawi, the al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist who wreaked havoc in Iraq but alienated many of al Qaeda's potential supporters with his indiscriminate killing of other Muslims.

Source:

IN their own words: Al qaeda

Binny loosing control

Bin Laden losing control of Al Qaeda?

Bin Laden losing control of Al Qaeda?

By Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau

According to a Taliban liaison officer with Al Qaeda, bin Laden recently learned that a faction within his own organistion had been conspiring to sideline him

LONELY, marginalisd and suddenly suspicious that he was losing his grip over the organistion he helped create, Osama bin Laden finally decided that enough was enough. At least that’s the explanation sources close to him are giving for why, after three long years of silence, the Qaeda leader has released one video and two audiotapes in the past month, including last week’s audio message calling for a jihad against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. According to Omar Farooqi, a Taliban liaison officer with Al Qaeda, bin Laden recently learned that a faction within his own organistion had been conspiring to sideline him, insisting-unnecessarily, bin Laden now believes-that he remain secluded for security reasons. CIA officials told Newsweek they could neither confirm nor reject the theory.

Bin Laden had long been chafing at this imposed gag order, says Farooqi, who learned from Sheik Saeed, Al Qaeda’s senior leader in Afghanistan, and other top operatives that bin Laden became “extremely upset” earlier this year when he discovered that some of his lieutenants feared he was dead. Bin Laden has always loved talking to the media-he used to infuriate his onetime protector, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, by holding press conferences-and, according to Farooqi, bin Laden had only reluctantly gone along with the advice that his safety required absolute silence.

Farooqi refused to say which faction bin Laden believes is responsible for the so-called conspiracy, though several Taliban sources pointed to Ayman Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy, suggesting that he might have been trying to solidify his own authority. This summer Farooqi and other Taliban sources told Newsweek that a split had emerged in Al Qaeda between the organistion’s powerful Egyptian faction, led by Zawahiri, and its Libyan wing over jihadist strategy. Ever since the 2001 collapse of the Taliban, Zawahiri has been plotting to kill his nemesis, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, narrowly missing twice in 2003. But the Libyans, led by Abu Yahya al-Libi, had argued that Al Qaeda’s resources should be focused on supporting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq and fomenting terrorism in the West.

The Egyptian-Libyan feud may now be history, though, thanks to Musharraf’s decision in July to storm the radical Red Mosque in the heart of Islamabad, during which the mosque’s radical leader Abdul Rashid Ghazi was killed. Within days, Zawahiri issued a video calling on Pakistanis to “revolt”.

Soon afterward, al-Libi followed suit. Even bin Laden, who had never before called on Pakistanis to rise up against Musharraf, did so in his latest audiotape. Despite the unity over Musharraf, though, there is still plenty of talk within Al Qaeda over Zawahiri’s grip on resources.

And what about those who had tried to sideline bin Laden? With Osama seemingly back in charge, they can only support him, at least for now. courtesy newsweek..

AL QAEDA's EFFORT TO GET PEOPLE TO BELIEVE BIN LADEN ISN'T DEAD

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Al Qaeda's new leaders