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Labels: IATT, Our Intel Production
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DEBKAfile Exclusive Report
October 25, 2008, 8:13 PM (GMT+02:00)
In a follow-up to the incipient thaw in US relations with Damascus, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has relayed a message to Hamas political leader Khalid Meshaal. DEBKAfile’s Middle East sources also reveal that on Oct. 21, Syria completed its encircling deployment of Lebanon after an unacknowledged nod from the Bush administration. Four Syrian divisions are now massed on Lebanon’s northern and eastern borders and opposite Israel’s northern border positions. (See attached exclusive DEBKA map.)
In the exclusive report below, excerpts fromDEBKA-Net-Weekly 367, 368 and 369, reveal how the process started and evolved and are updated by DEBKAfile.
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Al-Qaida influence apparent in groups in Pakistan 25 Oct 2008 16:30, Examiner
... burly, black-bearded Pashtun, holding a picture of his young nephew. "They go to the Taliban but they get their training from the Arabs. It all comes from al-Qaida." Al-Qaida's
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Labels: Ops and Intel UPDATE
Wednesday, 22 October 2008.
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—Wherewould you put your money: On an America burdened by a $10 trillion debt or a China flush with almost $2 trillion cash reserves, the largest in the world?
You would think Pakistan is the luckiest country in the world for beingChina’s close ally as the world faces economic decline. Wrong.
The truth is, we have a ruling class that has been betting on the wrong horse. President Zardari should know. But by no means is this his mistake alone. This is more about a shortsighted political elite that sits on one of the world’s hottest pieces of real estate – Pakistan – and simply doesn’t know what to do with it. Even MacDonald’s does a better job with its properties.
YOU THINK MACDONALDS IS GOING TO STICK AROUND IF THE TALIBAN AL QAEDA'S ALLY TAKES OVER?
PAKISTAN IS NOT A GREAT OR HOT PIECE OF REAL ESTATE, NOW IT IS CLOSE TO DEFAULT BECAUSE THEY CAN'T MAKE UP THEIR MIND ABOUT TERRORISTS, BOMBING MOSQUES, KILLING WOMEN, CHILDREN, BOMBING MARKET PLACES, TRAINING CHILDREN TO BEHEAD. WHERE IS THE PAKI PRIDE, GUTS?
ahmedquraish WOULD HAVE YOU LIVING UNDER THE
THREAT OF THE TALIBAN, THAT WORKED OUT REAL WELL
IN AFGHAN, TALIBAN MOVED AFGHAN RIGHT BACK
TO THE 1800'S.
SOME PROGRESS.
NO ONE IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD INVEST IN THIS MESS, A FEW MONTHS AGO THE PAKI ECONOMY WAS LEADING THE WORLD.
Why should China come to rescue a defaulting Pakistani elite that has placed all its eggs in the American basket? The bitter truth is that bothSaudi Arabia and China want to helpPakistan. Both maintain strong military ties with Pakistan. But currently they are reluctant to contribute to the survival of a government in Islamabad that appears a little too pro-American than the acceptable limits for a sovereign nation. Let the Americans handle their own mess in Pakistan. This is the new attitude. That’s why the Saudi oil concession and the Chinese billions are not coming.
NO THE REASONS THE MONEY ISN'T COMING IN HAS TO DO WITH RISK REWARD RATIOS.
WITH THE TALIBAN RUNNING AROUND DOING SUICIDE BOMBINGS AND PAKI WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF THIS THREAT IT SIMPLY MAKES PAKI A BAD RISK.
AND PAKI'S ONLY ALLY WILLING TO BACK THEM WITH BILLIONS OF DOLLARS HAS BEEN AMERICA.
BUT PAKI INSISTS ON PLAYING THE GREAT GAME, PLAYING BOTH SIDES.
REMOVE THE THREAT OF THE TALIBAN AND AL QUADA AND FUNDS WILL POOR IN FROM BOTH CHINA AND THE SAUDIES.
PAKI DOESN'T BELIEVE IN ahmedquraish PROPAGANDA,
HIS TALK LACKS REASON,
OR ANY CONNECTION TO REALITY.
America will spend its self into a depression to kill
al qaeda
and reduce the taliban threat, ahmedquraish,
some gratutide.
Paki's choice, bin Laden or bankruptcy.
Gerald
Anthropologist
Broker NYSE series 7 and 13
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Labels: ahmedquraishi NUTZ?
Is the demand for access tocompromised legitimate portfolios of domains -- where the price is based on the pagerank and is shaped by the number of domains in question -- the main growth factor for the increasing supply of such stolen accounting data, or is it the result of cybercriminals data mining their botnets for accounting data that would provide them with access to such portfolios of high trafficked domains with clean reputation? Moreover, would such a data mining approach made easily possible due to the availability of botnet parsing services and stolen accounting data dumps streaming directly from a botnet, would in fact be the more efficient approach in injecting their malicious presence on as many hosts as possible, next to the plain simple massive SQL injection approach?
As always, it's a matter of who you're dealing with, and their understanding of the exclusiveness of a particular underground item at a given period of time. This exclusiveness is inevitably going to increase due to the fact that they're several "vendors" that are already purchasing access to such portfolios, as well as compromised Cpanel accounts as a core business, the access to which they would later on either resell at a higher price enjoying the underground market's lack of transparency, or directly monetize and break-even immediatelly. As for this particular proposition for an account with 404 domains in it, it's interesting to monitor how the seller is soliciting bids from multiple sources by leaving the price an open topic, clearly indicating his low profile into the underground ecosystem. How come? An experienced seller or buyer would be offering or requesting page rank verification respectively.
With nearly each and every aspect of cybercrime already available as a service, or literally outsourced as a process to those supposidely excelling into a particular practice, building capabilities for data mining botnets is no longer a requirement, with the people behind the botnets monetizing all the data coming from it by soliciting deals of accounting data dumps based on a particular country only.
Gerald
Tactical Internet Systems analyst
This afternoon, as part of a Washington Institute lecture series with senior US counterterrorism officials, we hosted Mike Vickers, Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict at the Department of Defense.
Mr. Vickers offered his thoughts on the threat facing the US, as well as the strategy necessary to defeat the global terrorist networks -- focusing on the role of the military in this effort. Of particular interest, he explained how the Special Operations have expanded since 9/11, and how much more they will still grow this decade. In his view, this is a step in the right direction in bolstering not only the US, but our partners counterterrorism capabilities. Here is an excerpt from his talk:
"Special Operations Forces and our Special Operations command down in Tampa has been really one of the growth stocks of the Department of Defense during this decade. By the end of the decade or probably early in the next decade, our Special Operations Forces will essentially twice as large as they were at the beginning of the decade. They'll reach about sixty-four -- the mid sixty thousands in terms of total manpower. There will have been more than a doubling of Special Operations command budget. There will be a lot more -- there already is -- but there will be a lot more flag officers and general officers who come from a Special Operations background among our senior leadership.
"If you look at the operational core of our Special Operations Forces, and focus on the ground operators, there are some 15,000 or so of those -- give or take how you count them -- these range from our Army Special Forces or our Green Berets, our Rangers, our Seals, some classified units we have, and we recently added a Marine Corps Special Operations Command to this arsenal as well. In addition to adding the Marine component, each of these elements since 2006 and out to about 2012 or 2013 has been increasing their capacity as well as their capabilities, but their capacity by a third. This is the largest growth in Special Operations Force history. By the time we're done with that, there will be some things, some gaps we need to fix undoubtedly, but we will have the elements in place for what we believe is the Special Operations component of the global war on terrorism.
"Special Operations Forces, I think through this decade and into the next one, have been and will remain a decisive strategic instrument. We used the -- when trying to answer the question about what made Special Operations Forces special, we like to say that well, it was because of this tactical virtuosity or the skill of the individual operator that they were trained to such a high level. My counterpart, Admiral Olson, and I now like to talk about it that it really is the strategic employment or impact that these forces cumulatively have in this broad war that we find ourselves in that really is what's making them special. It's not so much the virtuosity, though that remains and is on display almost every day overseas."
To read the entire transcript from today's session, click here:
2nd story:
That's according to a draft document, "Cyberspace Operations -- Air Force Doctrine Document 2-11," obtained by Inside Defense. “Freedom of action... can be seen as freedom from attack and freedom to attack,” the paper states. But, it adds, “The size and complexity of the domain and the extensive collection of networks... can make freedom of action difficult and perhaps elusive.” For years, the Air Force has been trying to ramp up its network war plans. But the service has had trouble deciding exactly what it wants those cyber battle plans to be. In 2005, the Air Force changed its mission statement to read, "As Airmen, it is our calling to dominate Air, Space, and Cyberspace." Then the service announced a far-reaching effort to set up a "Cyber Command," responsible for that dominance. But by August of this year, that project was put on hold, after it became painfully obvious that no one was really sure what the new command would really do (or even how to define the term "cyber.") Now, those network warriors will fall under the purview of Air Force Space Command. Continue reading "Air Force Wants 'Freedom to Attack' Online" » xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx THEY DON'T HAVE A CYBER COMMAND IN USA. LET ALONE A GOLBAL Counterterrorism Cyber Network. GERALD Tactical Internet Systems analyst .Air Force Wants 'Freedom to Attack' Online
Labels: Global Counterterrorism Cyber Network, not
In cryptanalysis and computer security, a dictionary attack is a technique for defeating a cipher or authentication mechanism by trying to determine its decryption key or passphrase by searching likely possibilities. In contrast with a brute force attack, where a large proportion key space is searched systematically, a dictionary attack tries only those possibilities which are most likely to succeed, typically derived from a list of words in a dictionary. Generally, dictionary attacks succeed because many people have a tendency to choose passwords which are short (7 characters or fewer), single words in a dictionary, or are simple variations that are easy to predict, such as appending a single digit to a word.
Dictionary attacks may be applied in two main situations:
In the latter case, the effect of a dictionary attack can be greatly reduced by limiting the number of authentication attempts that can be performed each minute, and even blocking further attempts after a threshold of failed authentication attempts is reached. Generally, 6 attempts is considered sufficient to cope with mistakes made by legitimate users; beyond that, one can safely assume that the user is a malicious attacker.
However many systems store a hashed version of the password and make it available under certain circumstances, such as a challenge-response authentication exchange between two parties. If an attacker can obtain the hashed password, they can test guessed passwords rapidly, often at a rate of tens or hundreds of millions of guesses per second. [1] The rate of guessing can be sharply reduced by using a key derivation function that is computationally intensive, such as PBKDF2. Since users often choose easily guessed passwords, this has historically succeeded more than 2 times out of 10 when a reasonably large list is used. Lists of commonly selected passwords are widely available on the Internet as are dictionaries for most human languages (even those no longer used), meaning even the use of foreign words has limited value in preventing dictionary attacks.
Spammers often use a form of dictionary attack, sometimes known as a Directory Harvest Attack, for e-mail address harvesting. For example, a spammer may try sending messages to adam@example.com, barbara@example.com, carl@example.com, etc. Any addresses to which messages are delivered, as opposed to being bounced back, can be added to the spammer's list of known-valid addresses.
Clifford Stoll's book, The Cuckoo's Egg, contains an account of a dictionary attack against the encrypted passwords kept in the passwd file on Unix systems, and of the reaction to the successful attack by the man (Robert Morris) who invented the one-way encryption system used for login passwords.
It is possible to achieve a time-space tradeoff through precomputation by encrypting and storing a list of encrypted dictionary words, sorted by the encrypted value. This requires a considerable amount of preparation time, but makes the actual attack almost instantaneous. The storage requirements for the pre-computed tables were once a major cost, but are less of an issue today due to the rapid improvements in hard drive technology. Pre-computed dictionary attack are particularly effective when a large number of passwords are to be cracked at once. A more refined approach involves the use of "rainbow tables." Salting is a technique that forces the encrypted dictionary to be recomputed for each password sought, potentially making precomputation infeasable, provided the salt is large enough
MAIL SERVER
A mail transfer agent (MTA) (also called a mail transport agent, message transfer agent, or smtpd (short for SMTP daemon)), is a computer program or software agent that transferselectronic mail messages from one computer to another.
The term mail server is also used to mean a computer acting as an MTA that is running the appropriate software. The term mail exchanger (MX), in the context of the Domain Name System formally refers to an IP address assigned to a device hosting a mail server, and by extension also indicates the server itself.
An MTA receives mail from another MTA (relaying) or from a mail user agent (MUA). The MTA works behind the scenes, while the user usually interacts with the MUA. Every time an MTA receives an e-mail, it will add a "Received:" trace header field to the top of the message. In this way, there is a record of which MTAs handled the e-mail and in which order. Upon final delivery, the "Return-Path:" header will also be added to record the return path.
The delivery of e-mail to a user's mailbox typically takes place via a mail delivery agent (MDA); many MTAs have basic MDA functionality built in, but a dedicated MDA like procmail can provide more sophisticated functionality.
According to one survey, sendmail, Microsoft Exchange Server, Postfix, and Exim together control over 85% of market share for SMTP service.[citation needed]
Another survey suggests a more balanced playing field, though it included hosted e-mail services such as Postini.[1]