Civilian Irregular Supporters

M 3-0 INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT for Civilian Irregular Supporters.

Somebody who supports the mission has to convey selected information and indicators to American audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of American politicians, organizations, groups, and individuals. Somebody who supports the mission needs to induce or reinforce American attitudes and behavior favorable to mission accomplishment. Plenty of elements who oppose the mission are doing this. Domestic oppositional elements deter the military from doing this for itself. Our defenders serve whatever political masters We The People saddle them with.

But who is THIS somebody?

Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group has the answer.

SOURCE:

Gerald

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Pakistan Defense Forces

Pakistan Defense Forces: Here.

AFGHAN


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Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group

STOLEN FROM: Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group

Tim Thomas, LTC, US Army, Retired, has done extensive research and publishing in the areas of peacekeeping, IO, and PSYOP. He currently serves as a Senior Analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft Leavenworth, and has written a fascinating piece entitled Hezballah, Israel, and and Cyber PSYOP which I encourage y’all to peruse and comment upon.

However, an evolving cyber phenomenon is underway: the concept of cyber psychological operations (CYOP, pronounced “PSYOP”)—which are cyber operations (those that use the computer chip) that aim to directly attack and influence the attitudes and behaviors of soldiers and the general population.

While armies continue to compete in digital battlespace, local populations are now caught up in digital influence space battles. As a result armies can no longer stand between an enemy and the public as they once did. [And America cannot rely on Regulars to neutralize and mitigate the effects of enemy propaganda on its national will — Cannoneer]. CYOP is also awash with “unintended consequences,” since we are only now starting to understand what degree of influence, persuasion, deception, and mobilization the cyber environment offers. For example, mobile (cell) phones became “tools for citizen journalism” in Lebanon since they provided people the capability to transmit audio, video and photographs by shortmessage service. Such contributions from “the street” carry their own form of psychological persuasion.

CYOP is characterized by speed, precision, and creativity. Speed is recognized due to the quickness of the message-response mechanism. An incident happens and is reported on the Internet, or via cell phone or video messaging, before legitimate [I’d put “scare quotes” around the word legitmate — Cannoneer] news services can adjudicate its authenticity. Notably, these message have infinite—yet precise—reach (some call CYOP precision guided messages ‘PGMs’). We can target friendly or enemy soldiers and populations with equal ease. Plus, creativity is an emerging issue.Technologies offer the ability to update time tested PSYOP techniques with new applications not tried or tested.

The cyber element enables traditional psychological operations (PSYOP) such as loudspeakers and leaflets to penetrate not just a few miles into enemy territory, but to intrude directly and pervasively into the local populations’ homes or across continents. The cyber element does so privately and quietly, invading not only computers and cell phones but the psychological well-being of the population as well. Local citizens on both sides of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict arevictims of an intense propaganda and counterpropaganda campaign, for the maintenance of public and international support.

According to Yonit Farago of www.timesonline.co.uk, [click on Israel backed by army of cyber-soldiers for a description of exactly what an American Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group should be doing] there is also an intense monitoring and counterpropaganda campaign underway by Israeli supporters. Special software termed “megaphone” is used to alert Jewish students to anti-Israeli chat rooms or Internet polls. These students then attempt to influence the course of a debate or an opinion survey by marshalling friends and supporters to take part. This allows a place where “networks of US and European groups with hundreds of thousands of Jewish activists can place supportive messages.”

US IO doctrine is weak (in fact, almost nonexistent) on the issue of counterpropaganda, and this is reflected in coalition operations.

. . . future wars will be personal, deceptive, civil-military, and involve worldwide recruitment. All of these items will be managed and performed by cyber elements . Ye l l o w journalism may also become a real threat.

One thing is very clear: CYOP is not only personal—but persuasive in new ways—some more powerful than any earlier PSYOP attempts. CYOP strikes raw nerves in a different way than a leaflet, due to its targeting precision with all forms of communications—auditory, visual, and print. CYOP appears to be a very invasive form of PSYOP that allows no mental sanctuary.

We must follow the CYOP phenomenon as it picks up momentum. Groups will initiate new and varied techniques, and everyone must be on guard to counter the unexpected. E-flets, silent loudspeakers, Google Earth, ring tones, and YouTube represent only the start of this phenomenon. Traditional PSYOP personnel will play a key role in uncovering the advantages offered by these technological advances, and then must creatively apply counters to them in warfare. [Non-traditional PSYOP personnel such as civilian auxiliaries will be quicker and more flexible, but Colonel Thomas was writing for a military readership — Cannoneer] CYOP can be private, silent, deceptive, intercontinental, and as full of hatred and prejudice as the initiator wants it to be—and all are issues that should concern us.

Good stuff. Put your thinking cap on and read it. The part about hard CYOP is downright scary. We aren’t fighting Industrial Age warfare between legitimate nation-state peers with Westphalian concepts of combatant and noncombatant, civilian and miltary. Everybody who can see this blog could be monitoring hostile sites and disseminating counterpropaganda. If the Israelis can do it, why can’t we? Y’all could be Cyber Guerillas.

Any cat wranglers out there?

( This is our Group IA , not the Israeli group)

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SOURCE CIIDG

Defense vs Interior ministries

There have also been complaints about
checkpoint officers asking for bribes.
Parliamentarian Abusi recalled being
stopped at a control in Karkh, where
the security forces asked her and her
guards for some ammunition.

"My guards were harassed five times
at checkpoints even though they
carry [ID] badges," she said.

Widad Mohammed, a 50-year-old housewife,
was travelling in to Amman when her
car was stopped at a checkpoint close
to Ghazaliya, west of Baghdad. The
security officer asked the driver to
give him a teapot he noticed in the
car, but the driver refused, stating
that he needed it for his passengers.

The security officer yelled at the
driver and beat him over the head.

"He threatened to confiscate the car
as a suspect vehicle, so the driver
paid him off so as to put an end to
it," recalled Widad.

At nightfall when the city goes under
curfew, the number of officers manning
security posts decreases because the
risk of attack is higher.

"I was shot when our checkpoint west
of Baghdad was attacked at night,"
said Khalil Mohammed, an 18-year-old
national guardsman. "The
insurgents usually attack us when it
gets dark."

The shortage of men at night makes it
easier for insurgents to plant
roadside explosive devices and car
bombs.

The success of the security strategy
is challenged by the barely-concealed
mistrust and rivalry between the
defence and interior ministries.
Often it seems they are in conflict
rather than cooperating with one
another.

A source close to the defence ministry
told IWPR that the two institutions
compete to deploy more troops than
each other. This, he said, "has
a negative effect on their performance
and weakens coordination".

The source blamed the rivalry on
sectarian feuding.

Both ministries refused to comment on
how decisions are made regarding the
location and staffing of their
checkpoints. In some instances, the
presence of forces from both ministries
at one location has created problems,
and on occasion this has led to armed
skirmishes.

An employee of the defence ministry
anonymously said that last January,
fighting erupted between the National
Guard and a police unit at a checkpoint
when the latter refused to follow
directions given by the military.

Hussein Jasim, a resident of Ur
neighbourhood in eastern Baghdad,
recalled an incident in January -
before the security plan came into
operation - that suggested a degree
of complicity between security forces
and paramilitary groups.

The incident began with a convoy of
11 cars full of militants arriving
in the neighbourhood, and firing mortars
at other areas.

www.iwpr.net