al Qaeda releases beheading videos ???

The video is actually old and the murders dates from November 2004 and early 2005, but it had never been released. Why would al Qaeda in Iraq release this video now nearly three years after the crime?

The video shows four hostages who al Qaeda claims are highway bandits confessing. Two are then murdered together and two more beheaded at different times.

The victims are: Othman Nasser Azawi, Ali Hassan Makhlaf, Joumouaa al Lwizi, & Abd Assatar al Sabaawi.

It's bad. Very very bad. If not the worst beheading snuff video I've ever seen, right up at the top. Sickening. Disgusting. The words don't even come close to painting a true picture.

jawa has it:here

By why would they release these beheading videos now?

AQ is begging for recruits and they are not getting them.

AQ webmasters have been taken out, and they search for any replacement, the chief requirement is loyalty not experience, security has to take precedence over ability as a web master.

So they have people running the web sites that are not experienced cadre.

"By their unique nature, terrorist organizations face difficult challenges in almost any operational environment, particularly in terms of maintaining situational awareness, controlling the use of violence to achieve specified political ends,..."

"We see a consistent focus on how to achieve the appropriate use of violence when the rank and file often clamor for more violence than is useful, or seek to enrich themselves in the course of their duties. Groups also struggle with the problem of maintaining situational awareness while staying covert, so that members understand which actions will support the political goal, and which will be counterproductive ( BEHEADINGS ). Finally, there is regular concern with balancing the need to control operational elements with the need to evade government attention and limit the consequences of any compromise."

"Security concerns mean they cannot perfectly monitor what agents are doing.20 Moreover, the nature of the operational environment means that it is hard to punish agents, even when leaders do catch them taking unauthorized actions. In terrorist groups, the agents hold an implicit threat over group principals—they can go to the government. For example, Jamal Ahmed Al Fadl, who testified in the Embassy bombing trial, stole money from al-Qa’ida, got caught, went on the run, and approached the U.S. government in an attempt to save himself and his family.

Open-source analyses of terrorist organizations generally begin from the perspective that members of these groups are uniformly motivated by the cause, are equally willing to sacrifice for the cause, agree on what the cause is, and see eye-to-eye on the best tactics to achieve their strategic end.24 However, substantial evidence has accumulated to indicate this is not the case. The Harmony documents reveal a surprising level of infighting and conflict, even within highly capable groups such as al-Qa’ida (Al Adl Letter, Harmony AFGP-2002-600080)."

Source:

PARADIGM INTEL INDICATES THE PUSH FOR RECRUITING CONTINUES AS THE NUMBER ONE GOAL, THEY VIEW THE CONTINUED DEGRATION OF THEIR RANK AND FILE AS THEIR MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM.

AND THE PRESSURE FOR RECRUITS HAS DROVE THE WEB SITE NEWBEES TO PUBLISH OLD BEHEADING VIDEOS TO CAPTURE MORE MARKET SHARE ( SURFERS ) EVEN THOUGH BEHEADING VIDS ARE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE TO THEIR political goals.

THEIR BID FOR MORE ISLAMIC RECRUITS HAS FAILED AND THEY NOW ARE SEEKING TO DEVELOP HOMEGROWN VARIETY SINCE THEIR ISLAMIC RECRUITING HAS FAILED. HENCE THE BEHEADING VIDEOS.

gERALD

Talk With a Suicide Bomber

A Talk With a Suicide Bomber

Friday, Jul. 20, 2007 By ROBERT BAER

A vehicle destroyed by a suicide bomber in the Logar province of Afghanistan.

Frazana Wahidy

Last week, at the Directorate of National Intelligence in Kabul, I met a failed suicide bomber. Arrested two weeks before in Jalalabad, preparing to assassinate the governor of Nangahar Province, Farhad was setting outside of Pakistan's Waziristan Province for the first time.

Only 17, he was terrified. Not only because of an uncertain fate, but perhaps more so because the world was not as the Taliban had described it. The Taliban indoctrinated him well, convincing him the Americans were stealing the faith of Afghan Muslims. Turning them into kafirs. I asked him if he hated the governor. No, it was simply that in working with the Americans he'd fallen away from Islam. He deserved to die.

It was immediately clear this kid was ignorant of the world; the boundaries of his village were his world. I asked him if he'd heard of Iraq. He had, but when I asked him if he could point it out on a map, he said he couldn't. The same with Palestine. I doubt that he'd ever seen a map.

That raised the question what he knew about Islam. When I asked he said he'd read the Quran. I asked it him if he understood it. He shook his head. It was then it became apparent his education went no farther than the madrassa—he was taught to recite the Quran in Arabic but did not understand a word. Other than what he was told.

And this is where the Taliban came in. Spotting him in the village mosque, they invited him to attend what can only be called an indoctrination course in Waziristan. There he was taught that suicide bombers go directly to heaven, where they're met by virgins and lush gardens. Farhad was also taught that any Muslim working with the Americans in Afghanistan was no longer a Muslim, but a "munafiq," a pretend Muslim. It was written in the Quran, Farhad was assured.

Even I, who have tried to get a grip on Muslim suicide bombing, was stunned by the depth of the brainwashing. I'd never seen anything like it. So I asked the question, What religion is Musharraf, the president of Pakistan? He's a Jew, the Taliban had assured Farhad.

No wonder Farhad agreed to go to Jalalabad to kill a fellow Muslim. Still, wasn't there a doubt in his mind about taking his life like that and who knows how many others? No. The Taliban had told him that when he pushed the button on his suicide vest, it was Allah then who would decide whether to summon him to heaven or not.

Earlier that day I'd visited NATO headquarters to talk to an American Marine colonel who tracks suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices. He came straight to the point: neither military force nor intelligence is going to stop suicide bombings. Only "mitigate" them. What NATO is pressing the Afghans to do is to deindocrinate young men like Farhad. But how do you get someone like Farhad, who may never have seen a map, change his radical worldview?

Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer assigned to the Middle East, is TIME.com's intelligence columnist and the author of See No Evil and, most recently, the novel Blow the House Down.