Fusion centers

Photo by Gerald, copyrighted.2008


The Success of the Fusion Strategy in Counterterror Operations
By Douglas Farah

After a few years in the wilderness, the U.S. military and its allies in other parts of the world have honed the cutting edge of a significant series of steps that are yielding highly successful results in combatting non-state armed groups-including terrorists, not just in Iraq but in Colombia and elsewhere.

The Washington Post's recent story on the "fusion cells" gets at the core of the program: The integration and blending of field intelligence (human and signal) with the ability to act rapidly on that information.

The NSA targeted its listening operations, the Treasury Department began tracing anything to do with money and Special Operations Forces, with the help of the latest technology and imaging capabilities, carry out the operations. This website was the first media outlet to discuss the operations of the joint DoD-Treasury "threat finance" cell unit in Baghdad in posts last November 2 and again on November 20, and the first publicly available monograph or study of terrorist financing by the Defense Department was released on October 12 of last year. "Threat finance" units are now operational in each of the military commands.

"To me, it's not just war-fighting now but in the future," Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the newspaper. "It's been the synergy, it's been the integration that has had such an impact."

One of the keys has been the ability, over time, to force the sharing of a range of skills in a single unit, so that the traditional segregation and stove pipes have ended. The value of tracing even useless-looking information, particularly from the "pocket litter" of those captured or killed, has proved itself on many occasions. ( Most agencys don't desire public info, the CIA reporting form for example on their web site doesn't even work. G)

While this is integration is a fact at the level of these small task forces, it remains far from accomplished on broad level. ( Our Intel terrorist IPs and evidence has been reported to appropriate agencys, and we track the news to see results, and we preserve an encrypted log on what we have reported to whom. G ) In fact, much of the upper tiers of the intelligence community are just as resistant Gto change and perhaps less inclined to share intelligence than 9-11.

But the success of fusing all elements of intelligence and force to capture often elusive enemies is not just evident in Iraq. In its own way, the Colombian military and policy have been on the cutting edge of the program in combating the FARC. My full blog is here.
September 8, 2008 11:02 AM Link

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US targets Haqqani Network in North Waziristan

By Bill RoggioSeptember 8, 2008 9:11 AM

Pictured is a composite image of Siraj Haqqani. These are the guys suspected of harboring Binny G

The US has conducted another attack inside Pakistan's tribal areas. More than 20 people, including nine Arab al Qaeda fighters, have been reported killed after the US fired multiple missiles at a home and madrassa, or religious school, owned by the Haqqani family in a village in North Waziristan. Today's attack inside Pakistan is the seventh reported strike in nine days, and the fourteenth such attack this year.

SOURCE: MORE:

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Update:

Killed were two wives of Haqqani, his sister-in-law, his oldest sister, two nieces, eight grandchildren and a male relative. A son-in-law of Haqqani was wounded.

Also killed were five al Qaeda operatives, two Azerbaijani and three Arabs: Hamza, Musa and Qasim.

This compound in Danday Darpakhel village is situated in front of the Pakistan Army camp in Miramshah.

Source:

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Haqqani's main madrassa hit in North Waziristan attack

September 9, 2008 12:03 AM ET
By Bill Roggio

US aircraft struck the Manbaul Ulom, the primary madrassa run by the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani family in order to "send a message." Five Haqqani compounds have been hit in the last ten days.

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Our reports one Haqqani clan. G

Gerald

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Jahidist online chatter,NIE

Reading Between the Intel Estimate's Lines

By Noah Shachtman July 17, 2007 | 11:35:52 AMCategories: Cloak and Dagger

Homeland security scoopmaster Shane Harris, on his new blog, says "there was one tantalizing bit at the end" of the new National Intelligence Estimate.

The estimate seemed to say that the intelligence agencies need to better position themselves to counter the Internet as a tool for terrorism...

The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.

Let me read between the lines here a bit. "The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment..." Here, they're talking about picking up on the signals of an attack--online chatter, rhetoric on jihadi Web sites, but also message traffic, probably money transfers. We've known for a long time that the intelligence agencies focus on the Web and online transactions to detect terrorist patterns.

But to the second point, this "will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots;" that strikes me as a pretty candid admission. It's not like the intelligence agencies are saying, "We can't detect plotting on the Internet," but they're clearly pointing out this is an area of concern, and one that's going to keep putting counterterrorism specialists through their paces.

In light of this challenge, the agencies will need "greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information." This strikes me as a clear reference to the use of fusion centers, which are supposed to marry local intelligence with the global threat picture. This could be seen as a shot at the Homeland Security Department. Theoretically, it's DHS' job to put those two pieces together--local and global--but it has never really worked out that way... This is a clear signal that the intelligence community sees fusion centers, and in the integration of local, national, and global threat reporting, as a vital part of domestic security.

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/07/reading-between.html