Internet Anthropologist Think Tank: Pakistan cannot win against the Taliban

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    Monday, March 16, 2009

    Pakistan cannot win against the Taliban

    Pakistan cannot win against the Taliban
    By Gerald; Internet Anthropologist Think Tank

    Paki passive agressive stance in the GWOT
    will not alow them to defeat the Taliban.

    In the past 4 years the Taliban has continually
    defeated the Paki Army and security forces
    to the point the insurgents now control more
    of the country then the Paki Government does.

    The Paki security forces have a co-dependant
    relationship with the insurgents.

    Its just a matter of time before they attack and
    control the large major population centers.

    The nuclear weapons remain a grave concern.
    nUCLEAR STATE? And home for al Qaeda.

    This paradigm is well documented by
    Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,
    latest news letter. Genius article.

    Pakistan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a 
    Counterinsurgency Strategy By Ahmed Rashid

    A few passages:

    in recent months, the Pakistani Taliban have made 
    unprecedented inroads into the world’s second 
    largest Muslim country and the only one armed with 
    nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s February concessions 
    to the Taliban in the Swat Valley of the North-West 
    Frontier Province (NWFP) are a watershed in the 
    country’s steady slide toward anarchy and the 
    growing acceptance of the Taliban’s control in 
    northern Pakistan.1 Subsequently, the Taliban 
    called for a cease-fire in Bajaur, a tribal agency 
    adjacent to Afghanistan where the Pakistani 
    government has been battling Taliban militants 
    since August 2008. While neither the government 
    nor the military seem capable of halting the Taliban’s 
    spread, the militants themselves are offering 
    cease-fires to Pakistan so that they can unite and 
    combine their resources to better combat Western 
    forces in Afghanistan in early spring.

    The army refuses to accept that the biggest threat 
    faced by Pakistan is the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, not
    the state of India. This article examines the Pakistan 
    Army’s failure to prepare for counterinsurgency 
    warfare, the army’s unsuccessful counterinsurgency 
    operations in the Bajaur tribal agency and the Swat 
    Valley, and the flaws inherent in arming pro-
    government tribal militias.

    Frontier Corps (FC)—the main paramilitary force in 
    FATA—in counterinsurgency warfare.

    Today, the FC soldier not only has family members 
    on the Taliban side in the present war in FATA and 
    Swat, but has become thoroughly imbued with jihadist 
    ideas and motivations.4 For a force that was told for 
    three decades that supporting jihad in Afghanistan 
    and India was part of state policy, it is naturally 
    proving contradictory for them now to be told that 
    the same jihadists are enemies of the state. 
    Therefore, it is not surprising that since 2004, when 
    the army and FC launched operations in FATA, the 
    FC has suffered from large-scale desertions, 
    surrenders and loss of morale.

    The operation caused 400,000 people to flee 
    Bajaur, and they are now living in poor conditions
    as internal refugees barely being looked after by 
    a financially strapped government.7 These 
    refugees include important tribal elders and chiefs
    and educated youth—all vehemently 
    anti-Taliban—who would have provided the 
    necessary support for military operations if they 
    had been protected in the first place. The most 
    common accusation among these refugees is that 
    the army was always killing the wrong 
    people—civilians rather than the Taliban.

    Most recently, the NWFP provincial government 
    also said that it will distribute 30,000 rifles to local 
    militias to defend their territories against the 
    Taliban.10 Such experiments, however, are likely
    to fail in Pakistan’s tribal areas because the 
    Taliban have successfully decimated the tribal 
    elite who would be the traditional leaders of such 
    militias. More than 300 tribal chiefs and elders 
    have been killed since 2004.11 The individuals 
    whom the government is now trying to promote 
    as tribal elders are not the traditional leaders 
    and consequently do not have the full support 
    of their tribes or clans. Similar attempts now 
    being carried out in selective provinces in 
    Afghanistan by the U.S. military are also fraught 
    with the same kind of dangers, as the Taliban 
    have also decimated the tribal elite in that country.
    In both war zones, the Taliban have deliberately 
    replaced the tribal elite with their own mullahs 
    who act as military commanders, judges of local 
    Shari`a courts and administrative heads.

    Excellent article, GOOD READ.


    Afghan doing better than Paki against the Taliban
    In Paki Taliban control more than 50%
    another 25% contested
    and 10% under the Taliban influence.
    5% under Paki Gov control
    See map
    Pakistans military a total failure.

    In Afghan athe situation is much better.
    See map
    Maps from Long War Journal, BILL ROGGIO





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