Pakistan cannot win against the Taliban

Pakistan cannot win against the Taliban

By Gerald; Internet Anthropologist Think Tank

03.16.09

Paki passive agressive stance in the GWOT

will not alow them to defeat the Taliban.

In the past 4 years the Taliban has continually

defeated the Paki Army and security forces

to the point the insurgents now control more

of the country then the Paki Government does.

The Paki security forces have a co-dependant

relationship with the insurgents.

Its just a matter of time before they attack and

control the large major population centers.

The nuclear weapons remain a grave concern.

HOW DOES THE WORLD DEAL WITH A FAILED 

nUCLEAR STATE? And home for al Qaeda.

This paradigm is well documented by

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,

latest news letter. Genius article.

March 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue LINK

Pakistan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a 

Counterinsurgency Strategy By Ahmed Rashid

A few passages:

in recent months, the Pakistani Taliban have made 

unprecedented inroads into the world’s second 

largest Muslim country and the only one armed with 

nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s February concessions 

to the Taliban in the Swat Valley of the North-West 

Frontier Province (NWFP) are a watershed in the 

country’s steady slide toward anarchy and the 

growing acceptance of the Taliban’s control in 

northern Pakistan.1 Subsequently, the Taliban 

called for a cease-fire in Bajaur, a tribal agency 

adjacent to Afghanistan where the Pakistani 

government has been battling Taliban militants 

since August 2008. While neither the government 

nor the military seem capable of halting the Taliban’s 

spread, the militants themselves are offering 

cease-fires to Pakistan so that they can unite and 

combine their resources to better combat Western 

forces in Afghanistan in early spring.

The army refuses to accept that the biggest threat 

faced by Pakistan is the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, not

the state of India. This article examines the Pakistan 

Army’s failure to prepare for counterinsurgency 

warfare, the army’s unsuccessful counterinsurgency 

operations in the Bajaur tribal agency and the Swat 

Valley, and the flaws inherent in arming pro-

government tribal militias.

Frontier Corps (FC)—the main paramilitary force in 

FATA—in counterinsurgency warfare.

Today, the FC soldier not only has family members 

on the Taliban side in the present war in FATA and 

Swat, but has become thoroughly imbued with jihadist 

ideas and motivations.4 For a force that was told for 

three decades that supporting jihad in Afghanistan 

and India was part of state policy, it is naturally 

proving contradictory for them now to be told that 

the same jihadists are enemies of the state. 

Therefore, it is not surprising that since 2004, when 

the army and FC launched operations in FATA, the 

FC has suffered from large-scale desertions, 

surrenders and loss of morale.

The operation caused 400,000 people to flee 

Bajaur, and they are now living in poor conditions

as internal refugees barely being looked after by 

a financially strapped government.7 These 

refugees include important tribal elders and chiefs

and educated youth—all vehemently 

anti-Taliban—who would have provided the 

necessary support for military operations if they 

had been protected in the first place. The most 

common accusation among these refugees is that 

the army was always killing the wrong 

people—civilians rather than the Taliban.

Most recently, the NWFP provincial government 

also said that it will distribute 30,000 rifles to local 

militias to defend their territories against the 

Taliban.10 Such experiments, however, are likely

to fail in Pakistan’s tribal areas because the 

Taliban have successfully decimated the tribal 

elite who would be the traditional leaders of such 

militias. More than 300 tribal chiefs and elders 

have been killed since 2004.11 The individuals 

whom the government is now trying to promote 

as tribal elders are not the traditional leaders 

and consequently do not have the full support 

of their tribes or clans. Similar attempts now 

being carried out in selective provinces in 

Afghanistan by the U.S. military are also fraught 

with the same kind of dangers, as the Taliban 

have also decimated the tribal elite in that country.

In both war zones, the Taliban have deliberately 

replaced the tribal elite with their own mullahs 

who act as military commanders, judges of local 

Shari`a courts and administrative heads.

Excellent article, GOOD READ.

SOURCE:

g

Taliban to join Northwest Frontier Police?

Update:

Afghan doing better than Paki against the Taliban

In Paki Taliban control more than 50%

another 25% contested

and 10% under the Taliban influence.

5% under Paki Gov control

See map

Pakistans military a total failure.

In Afghan athe situation is much better.

See map

Maps from Long War Journal, BILL ROGGIO

New State: Taliban swat in pAKI.

Gerald

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Paki hidden paradigm, deceit

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