Internet Anthropologist Think Tank: most youth hate Islam

From our source in the Iranian resiatance. G.

"There is hardly any religious fundamentalist left these days.
Only those who benefit directly form it ...like the Mullahs and their relatives or in the Arab world those who are really attached to Hezbollah...

The fact is that as the Mullahs in Iran have embarked in derailing the real Islamic tolerance and peace promised in its ideology and turned to fundamentalism, people get fed up: like in Iran..most youth hate Islam. They blame everything on Islam and the Arabs.

It is of course a misunderstanding, a predicament of what Khomienism has done in the whole region. Please do not under estimate Iranian mullahs. Although they are extremely fragile and weak in authority and have to exert extreme suppression to control the situation inside, and have to bribe their way even in the groups affiliated to them, but they are demagogues, mixing religion and polics. Which means you shall never find a specific trend or rhythm or any logical out come of a rhythmic politics. Khomeinism means , using religion to buy your way through with every means. The only language effective to them is FORCE."

From an Iranian insider.

Gerald

By Walid Phares

Counter Jihadists win

In contrast, findings show that the activities by counter-Jihadist Muslim groups and similar cadres are the leading factors to help resist the advance of radical mobilization. The equations I have tested for over twenty years are verifiable: every time Jihadists and counter-Jihadists engage in a battle of ideas, counter-Jihadists win. Every time Jihadists are alone on the scene, obviously, they win.

It is now imperative that a renewed debate about radicalization in Europe, particularly in light of an EU Czech Presidency for half a year, restructures the engagement process to include the democracy segments within Middle Eastern and Muslim communities on the continent. Czech and central European experience in dissidence-dynamics and counter totalitarian processes is a needed component in the wider European effort to contain the Salafist and Khomeinist ideological expansion.

Excerpted form Source:Link

The Counter Jahiddies are the best at the Information war.

Gerald

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By Andrew Cochran

On September 23, the Counterterrorism Foundation and New America Foundation held a live panel discussion on Capitol Hill with Peter Bergen, CTB Contributing Experts Evan Kohlmann and Paul Cruickshank, and guest commentator Maajid Nawaz to discuss "The Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda: Why Some of Al Qaeda’s Old Allies Have Turned Against It." You can view New America's video of that panel, and you can download a transcript, thanks to Assistant Newslink Editor Brett Wallace. Here are excerpts from the panel:

Peter Bergen: "There are two central fronts in the war on terror, Iraq and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. What happened with Al Qaeda in Iraq, it was an assisted suicide, we helped their suicide and so did the Sunni awakening. They had five problems. First they have terrible leadership. Al Masri who runs AQI is not Zarqawi, Zawahiri or Osama Bin Laden, he is a bad leader. Second is organization. Third is ideological problems, they can’t make compromises. They also have made a lot of enemies such as the 1920’s Brigade. Many of the recruits that have come to Iraq are gone because they commit suicide. The fact that we have seen female suicide attacks is a sign of weakness, not strength.

We know what these groups are against but what are they for? There is no al Qaeda minister of employment, Al Qaeda school, or Al Qaeda social welfare organization. There is not a category of government they have said they are not against, Russia, China, the West, Israel, Shiites and so on. Because of this problem they can’t turn themselves into political movements."

Even Kohlmann: "Arguably over any other issue, the predominant topic of discussion, controversy—and often schism—within the Salafi-Jihadi discourse has revolved around the justifications for deliberately killing other Sunni Muslims, including both innocent civilians and competing mujahideen fighters.

Nowhere else has that debate become more evident and problematic for Salafi-Jihadi leaders than in Iraq, where the insurgency has recently undergone a series of fundamental shifts. First, a wide array of prominent Sunni insurgent factions—including the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Iraqi Hamas, and Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya (to name just a few)—have become embroiled in bitter public feuds with Al-Qaida’s “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI) over the latter’s aggressive insistence that all Sunni insurgent groups join together under the banner of the ISI. The combined impact of this has undeniably had a debilitating impact on the long-term political viability of Al-Qaida and the ISI."

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