Internet Anthropologist Think Tank: FBI on top of terrorist in USA

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    Tuesday, October 02, 2007

    FBI on top of terrorist in USA

    An understanding of today’s al-Qa’ida requires an appreciation for the organization’s adoption of fourth generation warfare tactics.3 The concepts of fourth generation warfare were first presented in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article entitled “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” which argued that such warfare was “likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point.”

    Our kids could still be fighting this on a low grade, very high risk level, nukes, in the future.

    “This new type of war presents significant difficulties for the Western war machine” the publication said. “Fourth generation wars have already occurred and . . . the superiority of the theoretically weaker party has already been proven; in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations.”6 Al-Qa’ida’s adoption of fourth generation warfare tactics offer a useful case study for understanding networked terrorist organizations.

    al qaeda is organized for Internet war, USA has the power, but not the will yet.

    By their unique nature, terrorist organizations face difficult challenges in almost any operational environment, particularly in terms of maintaining situational awareness, controlling the use of violence to achieve specified political ends, and of course, preventing the authorities from degrading the group’s capabilities.

    They also face problems common to other types of organizations, including private firms, political parties, social movements, and traditional insurgencies. For example, political and ideological leaders—the principals—must delegate certain duties to middlemen or low-level operatives, their agents. But because of differences in personal preferences, as well as the need to maintain operational secrecy, terrorist group leaders cannot perfectly monitor what their agents are doing. Thus, preference divergence creates operational challenges which can be exploited to degrade a terrorist group’s capabilities.

    When combined with an assessment of what is known about the current characteristics of the al-Qa’ida network, this analysis reveals emerging organizational challenges, internal divisions, and an appreciation for where, and under what conditions, the network is most vulnerable to exploitation.

    These challenges lead to several recurring themes in terrorists’ organizational writings. We see a consistent focus on how to achieve the appropriate use of violence when the rank and file often clamor for more violence than is useful, or seek to enrich themselves in the course of their duties. Groups also struggle with the problem of maintaining situational awareness while staying covert, so that members understand which actions will support the political goal, and which will be counterproductive ( BEHEADINGS ). Finally, there is regular concern with balancing the need to control operational elements with the need to evade government attention and limit the consequences of any compromise.

    Security concerns mean they cannot perfectly monitor what agents are doing.20 Moreover, the nature of the operational environment means that it is hard to punish agents, even when leaders do catch them taking unauthorized actions. In terrorist groups, the agents hold an implicit threat over group principals—they can go to the government. For example, Jamal Ahmed Al Fadl, who testified in the Embassy bombing trial, stole money from al-Qa’ida, got caught, went on the run, and approached the U.S. government in an attempt to save himself and his family.

    Open-source analyses of terrorist organizations generally begin from the perspective that members of these groups are uniformly motivated by the cause, are equally willing to sacrifice for the cause, agree on what the cause is, and see eye-to-eye on the best tactics to achieve their strategic end.24 However, substantial evidence has accumulated to indicate this is not the case. The Harmony documents reveal a surprising level of infighting and conflict, even within highly capable groups such as al-Qa’ida (Al Adl Letter, Harmony AFGP-2002-600080).

    The primary cause of preference divergence over spending is a natural selection process that occurs over the course of terrorists’ career paths. Within the population of new terrorist recruits, there is a distribution of commitment to the cause.26 Even though all may seem quite committed to us, some are always more willing to sacrifice than others.27 Over the course of many years in the jihad, the most committed members are the most likely to volunteer for risky or inherently fatal assignments.


    As members of a cohort move into finance and logistics oriented positions, the proportion of less committed members will increase because those more committed remain in comparatively more dangerous assignments and are more prone to be selected out of the population. Note that terrorist organizations typically use individuals who have been around for some time to handle logistical and management tasks.28 What this career progression means is that, on average, those handling financial and logistical tasks will be more risk-averse and less committed than the leadership or rank-and-file.


    As introduced earlier, terrorist organizations face two tradeoffs that create internal discord. The security-efficiency tradeoff creates conflicts over spending when three conditions exist: (1) preferences over spending are not perfectly aligned;54 (2) principals cannot perfectly monitor their agents’ uses of money or cannot credibly punish them; and (3) resources are constrained so that leaders won’t just accept the financial inefficiencies created by agency problems.

    Propaganda grants authority to its makers. In the first place, simply by
    demonstrating its ability to disseminate information that the government has
    banned, a guerrilla group proves that it is a viable force.

    Second, once a group has the people’s ears and eyes it can manipulate their minds, causing them to act as they not might otherwise; or if it does not work as effectively as this, its messages at
    least command the attention of those who read, hear or see them. In words and
    pictures, those whose plans are hidden from public view can portray themselves
    any way they please. Furthermore, if appearing to play a particular role can win
    support, propaganda will help these guerrillas to become in fact the powerful forces
    that they claim to be.



    Few technological innovations have had the impact of the internet and worldwide web. Beyond
    any doubt, in a comparatively short span of time, they have revolutionized communications,
    enabling the rapid (often in real-time), pervasive and, most important, inexpensive exchange of
    information worldwide. In terms of political activism, for the preceding reasons, it has been
    something of a godsend.

    It provides an effective way for groups to promote what some observers call a “global dialectic”——where awakening, awareness, activism and radicalism can be stimulated at a local level and then mobilized into a wider process of dissent and protest.10

    “Groups of any size, from two to millions,’ Professor Dorothy E. Denning of Georgetown
    University points out, “can reach each other and use the Net to promote an agenda. Their
    members and followers can come from any geographical region on the Net, and they can attempt to influence foreign policy anywhere in the world.”

    Today, almost without exception, all major (and many minor) terrorist and insurgent groups have web sites.17 As a researcher at the U.S. government’s Foreign Broadcast and Information
    Service (FBIS)——now renamed, the Open Source Center (OSC)——observed some six years
    ago, “These days, if you’re not on the web, you don’t exist.”

    The FBI curently have 16 wana bee Internet Jahidists in custody, and monitoring another 9,000 wana Bees here in USA. Confidential sources.

    al Qaeda virtual from real separating the two.

    Internet jahidist webmasters buzzed, high.

    al Qaeda getting the HELL kicked out of it.

    al Qaeda recruiting kids

    terrorist arrested on Texas border
    and here.
    16 Iraqi arrested trying to cross border illegally

    al Qaeda using the "social net"

    al Qaeda's propaganda for Americans.

    Internet Jahidists life expatency 3 years.
    Iraq as Qaeda Bait


    FBI's new efforts
    With a united front that transcends national boundaries, agency jurisdictions, and national security disciplines. The Director says the FBI’s goal is to be an “effective bridge” in exactly those areas…and he gave several examples of how we’re filling that role today:
    • By working alongside the military in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, operating as a team to “search safe houses, collect biometric evidence, analyze explosive devices, and trace terrorist financing.”
    • By becoming a fully integrated member of the Intelligence Community, with stronger than ever relationships with the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security.
    • By sharing information “on a daily basis with our intelligence counterparts on every continent, from MI5 in Britain to the Mabahith in Saudi Arabia.”
    • By working closely with our 800,000 state and local law enforcement partners in the U.S. and with our counterparts overseas through our international offices now located in 60 capitols worldwide.
    • And by being a part of globally coordinated investigations, where in the Tsouli case, for example, many different countries “made joint decisions as to when to move in and disrupt the plots, so as to protect the integrity of each other’s operations.”

    The FBI curently have 16 wana bee Internet Jahidists in custody, and monitoring another 9,000 wana Bees here in USA. Confidential sources.


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