US cyber command big strides

In our review of Military Cyber doctrine we find they have a good grasp

of the scope and range of the Threats.

But are lacking in the development of paradigms to handle these 

threats. 

For instance they are aware the WWW is vulnerable and have

taken steps to secure the WWW nodes from major huge DOS

attacks.

But the possibility of unknown threats still exists.

And the Military could find itself in combat without

access to the WWW. 

We have seen the seminal solution to a attack on 

the WWW nodes in Stuxnet and feel confident in the ability

of NSA to combat a DOS attack on the nodes, but unknown
threats lurk.

A exercise involving  shutting down the WWW for a

section of the active combat forces would seem mandated.

The hidden problems would come to light and possible 

solutions could be spotted in advance of the event.

Com CB radios and shortwave.

Its not reasonable to assume the WWW will never go down.

Can US forces function without WWW access?

An exercise to see how fast they can set up a world

wide intranet separate from the WWW for the Military

and one for the critical infrastructure?

How fast can they get a shipping transportation

system up to feed the country, if the WWW goes

down, what food supplies would be available?

Another problematic situation is their adherence

to out moded methods of response.

"observe-orient-decide-act"

In cyberspace, the time between execution and effect can be milliseconds.

Nonetheless, the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop remains a valid construct for examining the decision cycle in cyberspace. Ongoing operations can be considered those operations that span past the phases of warfare.

While this does not preclude "Rules of Engagement",

the lack of mention raises concerns, they have to have 

the legal and power to take the treat off line in milliseconds,

or the damage may be done before they can get approval

to act. A rule of engagement should be if successfully attacked, 

take that IP, attacker off line. NOW.

No approval, no review, no waiting for approval,

if they do its too late.

Cyber Command barking at wrong end of Dog.

Another problem is the Flash Crash paradigm,

there needs to be a liaison between the SEC and 

NSA before a catastrophic event. 

And the Intelligence community needs to 

get up todate on the new threat door opened

by the Supreme court.

http://warintel.blogspot.com/2010/10/

supreme-court-sells-out-america.html

And the Stuxnet paradigm is very serious.

While it provides an excellent deterrent,

it also invites retaliation on the basis of

anonymity, we are quite sure Iran is

working on a counter strike.

But this threat is maybe 2 years off,

but its coming.

Todate their cyber exercises have been too

modest and minor.

But we are pleased to see the leaps and 

bounds they have made confronting the 

cyber threats, headon.

http://warintel.blogspot.com/2010/10/

excellent-analysis-of-cyber-threat.html

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/

media/epubs/afdd3-12.pdf

Gerald

Internet Anthropologist

Tactical Internet Systems analyst.


Update: GAO


Of the 24 recommendations in the President’s May 2009 cyber policy
review report, 2 have been fully implemented, and 22 have been partially implemented. The two fully implemented recommendations involve appointing within the NSC.



Agencies are moving slowly because they have not been assigned roles
and responsibilities with regard to recommendation implementation.
Specifically, although the policy review report calls for the
Cybersecurity Coordinator to assign roles and responsibilities, agency
officials stated they have yet to receive this tasking and attribute this to
the fact that the Cybersecurity Coordinator position was vacant for 7
months.

SOURCE:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1124.pdf

.