Paki ISI is running the Taliban?

Paki ISI is running the Taliban?

By Gerald Internet Anthropologist Think Tank.

Or have ISI lost control and been co-opted by the Taliban?

Our Paradigm Intel from 04.03.09

http://warintel.blogspot.com/2009/04/exclusive-isi-running-taliban.html

Posted today, more support for our Hypothesis:

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is the vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he directs the Center for Terrorism Research. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in world politics at the Catholic University of America.

Shortly after 9/11, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage gave Pakistan the ultimatum that, in Musharraf’s words, “we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.”22 The first major battlefield in the war on terror was Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s geographic proximity and historical support for the Taliban made it strategically important. Armitage’s threat (along with several carrots) prompted Musharraf to announce a dramatic about-face, and closely align with the U.S. Mu-sharraf declared on January 12, 2002, that “no Pakistan-based organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of religion.”23 He banned five jihadist groups that day, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

The ISI had already developed a distinctive strategic and ideological outlook prior to 9/11 that favored support for stateless Islamist fighters. Hence, along with his changed policies, Musharraf sacked pro-Taliban commanders at the top levels of the ISI and military. Altogether, he “forced the reassignment or resignation of Pakistan’s intelligence chief, two top generals and a number of other military commanders—most of whom were regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist.”24

In addition to the firings, Mu-sharraf made other changes aimed at purging officers with extremist sympathies from the military and ISI. In February 2002, for example, Pakistan began “to disband two major units of its powerful intelligence service that had close links to Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir.”25 But this was not enough to transform the strategic and ideological outlook of either institution. Many military and ISI officers remained tied to the Taliban militants andmujahideen with whom they had built relations over the course of two decades. Moreover, the Frankenstein monster of Pakistan-created jihadist groups was now out of control: Pakistan created many such groups, and supported them for over a decade. It couldn’t simply cut them all off at once.

Today, support for jihadist groups occurs at three levels within Pakistan’s ISI and military. First, there is an institutional policy of support within the ISI for actors such as the Haqqani network, Mullah Omar’s Taliban, and perhaps other jihadist groups that have ties to al-Qaeda at top levels.

Second, beyond the ISI’s explicit policies, rogue elements of Pakistan’s ISI and military have provided support for jihadistgroups against the policies of their institutions. These elements have been implicated in several recent terrorist incidents, and peripheral evidence suggests that these may only be the tip of the iceberg. Major incidents where rogue elements within Pakistan’s ISI or military may have been involved include the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the July 2008 bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul, the September 2008 Islamabad Marriott bombing, and assassination attempts directed at Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto. However, few—if any—Western analysts have a good sense of what percentage of people within the ISI support jihadistgroups against the policies of Pakistan’s government. There is also an open question as to whether these rogue elements are acting individually, or if they constitute factions within the ISI and the military.

Third, retired ISI and military officers with connections to Islamic militancy often remain influential following their retirement. One example is former ISI head Hamid Gul, who in 2003 declared that “God will destroy the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan and wherever it will try to go from there.” In late 2008, the U.S. sent a secret document to Pakistan’s government linking Gul to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and India has demanded his arrest in connection with the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.26

There is frequently overlap between these three levels. For example, retired ISI officers frequently work for the organization as contractors, and a number of analysts believe that contractors are the strongest link insofar as support for jihadist groups against the ISI’s policies is concerned. It is clear that all three levels of support create problems for U.S. interests in the region, while strengthening jihadist groups.

SOURCE:

Gerald

.