Paki Brinksmanship
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
The Pakistani government's inability to stem Taliban advances has forced the Obama administration to recalibrate its Afghanistan-Pakistanstrategy a month after unveiling it.
What was planned as a step-by-step process of greater military and economic engagement with Pakistan -- as immediate attention focused on Afghanistan -- has been rapidly overtaken by the worsening situation on the ground. Nearly nonstop discussions over the past two days included a White House meeting Monday between Obama and senior national security officials and a full National Security Council session on Pakistan yesterday.
A tripartite summit Obama will host here next week with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai will center heavily on the Pakistan problem rather than the balance originally intended, officials said.
New consideration is being given to a long-dormant proposal to allow U.S. counterinsurgency training for Pakistani troops somewhere outside the country, circumventing Pakistan's refusal to allow American "boots on the ground" there. "The issue now is how do you do that, where do you do it, and what money do we have to do it with?" said a senior administration official who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity yesterday.
On Capitol Hill, anxious lawmakers proposed breaking $400 million out of the administration's pending $83 billion supplemental spending request in order to fund immediate counterinsurgency and economic assistance to Pakistan. "We could pass it really quickly, in just a matter of days," said Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), who just returned from Pakistan. Waiting for debate and approval of the entire supplemental, Kyl said, "could be too little, too late.
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Some misconceptions about the Taliban
There are certain explanations of the phenomenon of the Taliban which tend to strengthen the broad misconceptions on the subject in Pakistan. When these come from retired Pakistani generals, such “theorising” points to the intent behind the policies followed in the past; it also complicates the collective effort in Pakistan to face up to the threat of the Taliban. Above all, it highlights the “psychological” problems among the officers who dealt with the Americans on the one hand and Afghan warlords on the other as “partners” in Afghanistan, and their ultimate “break” with the post-9/11 decisions made in Islamabad.
Some retired officers say the Taliban are fighting to avenge what took place in Pakistan following the September 11, 2001 attacks, especially those [Taliban] fighting to avenge what happened during the military operation that was carried out in Lal Masjid. But, they claim, these are not currently active after the new government took over power in Islamabad. Who, then, are these Taliban who apparently went to Afghanistan after 9/11 to “fight the Americans” and then got offended with the Lal Masjid operation in 2007, and then in 2008 simply stopped existing?
What has been left out in these claims is the “creation” of Pakistani Taliban to help the Kabul government of Mullah Umar after 1997 against resistance from what later came to be called Northern Alliance, whose leader Ahmad Shah Massoud was killed by Al Qaeda hours before 9/11. No reference is made by these retired army officials to the despatch of thousands of seminarians from the Pakistani border areas into Afghanistan as warriors. Before 9/11, when the Americans were bothered by Al Qaeda and wanted Pakistan to help get the Taliban to oust Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan, Pakistan decided to pursue strategic depth instead of fighting global terrorism. In fact, there is some evidence that on the Pakistani side, policy was “diversified” on the basis of “personal” affiliations between Mullah Umar and some key Pakistani officials.
One general interviewed proudly said that when “he sent his two sons to jihad” against the Soviet forces “along with the Afghan jihadi leader Jalaluddin Haqqani” it was on the general pattern of intelligence officers pursuing state policy without letting their personal friendships with the Taliban get in the way. Here is one classic view: “I am a retired official but the Al Qaeda Afghan elements — Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Karzai (sic!), and others — are against Pakistan, but they are my friends”. What applies to this gentleman is, however, not supposed to apply to the personnel now in service. This is supposed to mean that the “allegations” that Pakistan has a nexus with Haqqani and Hekmatyar today are incorrect. The opposite is the case actually.
The part about those among the Taliban who were offended by the Lal Masjid affair and then “gave up” after the coming to power of the new government in 2008, remains obscure. Lal Masjid was the underside of Pakistan’s Taliban policy of “strategic depth”. The non-Islamists within the structure of the state focused on its India-specific intent and were not bothered by the nexus they thus formed with officials who interpreted “depth” as a transformation of Pakistan itself. Lal Masjid was allowed to become a watering-hole of all kinds of terrorist organisations with Al Qaeda affiliations. The proof of this came when revenge against the Lal Masjid operation was vowed by Aiman Al Zawahiri himself in a special message and echoed by the Taliban in South Waziristan and Swat.
The assertion that “we helped the Taliban at first but we ended the training in 1989”, leaves out the entire swath of activities that involved the preparation of jihadi organisations inside Pakistan used in Indian-administered Kashmir as “freedom-fighters” despite the fact that they were beginning to be dubbed terrorists at the UN Security Council and put on watch-lists in the West. As Mr Rehman Malik says, these Pakistan-trained militias are now with the Taliban.
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ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Heavy fighting raged for a third day in Pakistan’s northwest on Thursday as civilians flooded from the area and the Pakistani military reported some gains in pushing backTaliban insurgents.
The Pakistani military secured mountain passes to the west and south of Buner, a district 60 miles from the capital, according to its spokesman, Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, who spoke at a news briefing at the military headquarters in Rawalpindi. Helicopter gunships also rocketed Taliban positions in the north of Buner, where the militants had apparently fortified positions in areas adjoining their stronghold in the Swat Valley.
While government forces consolidated control of Buner’s main town, Daggar, General Abbas said it could take still another week for the operation to clear the whole district of militants, as the military was proceeding slowly to defuse booby traps and avoid civilian casualties.
The militants continued to unleash attacks, hitting a checkpoint belonging to government paramilitary forces from the Frontier Corps in northern Buner, and seizing several police stations across the region, including two in the upper reaches of Swat.
Suicide car bombers also tried to hit government troops in the south of Buner but were destroyed before they could reach their targets, General Abbas said. About 50 members of the police and paramilitary forces were still being held hostage by the Taliban in Buner.
Still, the government and the military repeated their support for the peace agreement forged in February with militants, under which the government agreed to install Shariah courts, based on Islamic law, throughout seven districts in the Malakand region, including Swat and Buner.
“The army has faced extreme criticism in the last two to three months, but we think that the peace agreement is a good agreement,” General Abbas said. “If peace can be brought in the region without further destruction, then it will be a victory for all. But the other side is violating from Day 1. We have kept informing the government of the violations.”
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In a conference held April 19, 2009 in Karachi, Pakistan, Islamic clerics and political leaders called the Taliban "enemies of humanity," and denounced the Pakistani government for signing the Shari'a for Peace deal, which permits the Taliban to enforce the Shari'a in Pakistan's Swat Valley district and broader Malakand Division. The deal was recently signed into law by Pakistani President Asif Zardari as "Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009."(1)
Following are details, and excerpts from statements by the conference participants, as published in Pakistani papers and websites.
Unite "Against the Scourge That Is the Taliban… to Save Pakistan from Utter Destruction"
The conference was organized by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the third largest political party in Pakistan, and led by Altaf Hussain, who resides in London.(2) It was attended by a large number of religious leaders, Islamic scholars, political activists and Sufis, representing various schools of Islamic thought, both Sunni and Shi'ite.(3)
Addressing the conference from London by phone, MQM leader Altaf Hussain expressed regret that no political party in Pakistan was voicing concern over the Taliban's takeover of the country, and urged both the people and the religious leaders of Pakistan to unite against the enforcement of the Taliban's version of the Shari'a. He also urged Pakistan's religious scholars, intellectuals, journalists, human rights activists and ''all peace-loving citizens who believe in humanity" to come out against the Taliban's "pseudo-ulema," and "to fulfill their religious obligations by uniting against the scourge that is the Taliban, in order to save Pakistan from utter destruction.'' (4)
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By Gerald
The Paki's are engaging in brinksmanship
with their nuclear weapons. Risking loosing
control of the nukes to the Taliban in exchange
for the billions of anti Terrorist dollars from the USA.
Paki is betting they can let the Taliban run wild
and still have tghe ability to stop the Taliban
if they need to.
The risk is loosing control of the nukes the reward
is billions of dollars to fight the Taliban.
The evidence is there for everyone to see.
Paradigm Intel is very clear,
see our article here, link
USA needs a new carrot and stick paradigm.
NEW $7.5 billion in civilian aid pay outs:
$3 Billion for Binnys head on a Stick.
$2 Billion for big Z;s head on a stick.
$2 Billion for Omars head on a Stick.
0 for Sacrifices, Payment for Victorys only
A Paki Army of over 500,000 trained troops
can't defeat the Taliban 50,000 farmers..
They can;t defeat them because they don't want to.
End the FREE lunch and watch the Paradigm switch.
Gerald
Anthropologist
.
Training Paki troops for Insurgent fighting
is a no starter until the Taliban within the ISI
are removed.
Labels: Paki Brinksmanship
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