By Gerald; Internet Anthropologist Think Tank
03.16.09
Paki passive agressive stance in the GWOT
will not alow them to defeat the Taliban.
In the past 4 years the Taliban has continually
defeated the Paki Army and security forces
to the point the insurgents now control more
of the country then the Paki Government does.
The Paki security forces have a co-dependant
relationship with the insurgents.
Its just a matter of time before they attack and
control the large major population centers.
The nuclear weapons remain a grave concern.
HOW DOES THE WORLD DEAL WITH A FAILED
nUCLEAR STATE? And home for al Qaeda.
This paradigm is well documented by
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,
latest news letter. Genius article.
Pakistan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a
Counterinsurgency Strategy By Ahmed Rashid
A few passages:
in recent months, the Pakistani Taliban have made
unprecedented inroads into the world’s second
largest Muslim country and the only one armed with
nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s February concessions
to the Taliban in the Swat Valley of the North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP) are a watershed in the
country’s steady slide toward anarchy and the
growing acceptance of the Taliban’s control in
northern Pakistan.1 Subsequently, the Taliban
called for a cease-fire in Bajaur, a tribal agency
adjacent to Afghanistan where the Pakistani
government has been battling Taliban militants
since August 2008. While neither the government
nor the military seem capable of halting the Taliban’s
spread, the militants themselves are offering
cease-fires to Pakistan so that they can unite and
combine their resources to better combat Western
forces in Afghanistan in early spring.
The army refuses to accept that the biggest threat
faced by Pakistan is the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, not
the state of India. This article examines the Pakistan
Army’s failure to prepare for counterinsurgency
warfare, the army’s unsuccessful counterinsurgency
operations in the Bajaur tribal agency and the Swat
Valley, and the flaws inherent in arming pro-
government tribal militias.
Frontier Corps (FC)—the main paramilitary force in
FATA—in counterinsurgency warfare.
Today, the FC soldier not only has family members
on the Taliban side in the present war in FATA and
Swat, but has become thoroughly imbued with jihadist
ideas and motivations.4 For a force that was told for
three decades that supporting jihad in Afghanistan
and India was part of state policy, it is naturally
proving contradictory for them now to be told that
the same jihadists are enemies of the state.
Therefore, it is not surprising that since 2004, when
the army and FC launched operations in FATA, the
FC has suffered from large-scale desertions,
surrenders and loss of morale.
The operation caused 400,000 people to flee
Bajaur, and they are now living in poor conditions
as internal refugees barely being looked after by
a financially strapped government.7 These
refugees include important tribal elders and chiefs
and educated youth—all vehemently
anti-Taliban—who would have provided the
necessary support for military operations if they
had been protected in the first place. The most
common accusation among these refugees is that
the army was always killing the wrong
people—civilians rather than the Taliban.
Most recently, the NWFP provincial government
also said that it will distribute 30,000 rifles to local
militias to defend their territories against the
Taliban.10 Such experiments, however, are likely
to fail in Pakistan’s tribal areas because the
Taliban have successfully decimated the tribal
elite who would be the traditional leaders of such
militias. More than 300 tribal chiefs and elders
have been killed since 2004.11 The individuals
whom the government is now trying to promote
as tribal elders are not the traditional leaders
and consequently do not have the full support
of their tribes or clans. Similar attempts now
being carried out in selective provinces in
Afghanistan by the U.S. military are also fraught
with the same kind of dangers, as the Taliban
have also decimated the tribal elite in that country.
In both war zones, the Taliban have deliberately
replaced the tribal elite with their own mullahs
who act as military commanders, judges of local
Shari`a courts and administrative heads.
Excellent article, GOOD READ.
g
Update:
Afghan doing better than Paki against the Taliban
In Paki Taliban control more than 50%
another 25% contested
and 10% under the Taliban influence.
5% under Paki Gov control
See map
Pakistans military a total failure.
In Afghan athe situation is much better.
See map
Maps from Long War Journal, BILL ROGGIO
Gerald
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